




Brown and Wolf have provided us with a thought-provoking analysis of
why we should consider a restorative justice approach in lawyer discipline. The
literature on restorative justice is voluminous. This Article does not engage
with the ongoing debate as to what is and is not within the “restorative justice”
umbrella. Reviews of the restorative justice literature by Menkel-Meadow,1
Roche,2 and others confirm the wide variety of understandings of restorative
justice, the use of restorative processes, and the commitment to restorative val-
ues, though often described by another name. So, too, we will find this to be the
experience in the disciplinary system for Australian lawyers.
I seek to avoid any direct engagement with the more normative critiques
of restorative justice as a general theory of justice. Any consideration of
whether lawyer disciplinary systems should and could move to a more restora-
tive approach must take heed of empirical assessments of the contexts in which
restorative justice appears to work most effectively. This Article does not claim
to provide any comprehensive assessment of the likely level of “fit” between
restorative justice and lawyer discipline. Instead, it merely seeks to highlight a
few areas that are likely to require some further thought, consideration, and
research in the future.
For the purposes of this Article, I have adopted Brown and Wolf’s under-
standing of a restorative justice model that distinguishes it from other forms of
responding to complaints about lawyers. For instance, it will be assumed that,
essentially, an ideal restorative justice model would involve multiple stakehold-
ers, not just a lawyer and regulator, and not just a lawyer and the client com-
plainant. Instead, ideally, it would involve a roundtable that at least included
the affected client, the lawyer complained about, his or her colleagues, and
other members of the profession concerned about the impact of the lawyer’s
conduct, and in which no party dominated.3
This Article first provides a brief history and overview of lawyer4 disci-
pline in Australia. Brown and Wolf believe enormous changes would be needed
* Senior Lecturer, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Austl. Email:
l.haller@unimelb.edu.au.
1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2007).
2 Declan Roche, Dimensions of Restorative Justice, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 217 (2006).
3 JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 12 (2002).
4 The term ‘attorney’ is not commonly used in Australia. Hence, the term lawyer will be
used, but the terms are interchangeable.
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to introduce a consumer protection model of lawyer regulation in the United
States.5 As will be seen, in Australia, legislative supports for consumer protec-
tion and restorative responses to complaints about lawyers are well established.
However, the melding of these on top of a disciplinary system has proven prob-
lematic. Nor do these legislative supports necessarily reflect the current prefer-
ences of regulators. Rather, some regulators of lawyers in Australia appear to
have shunned formal, structured processes (like mediation) and instead have
fashioned less stable powers for themselves out of “public interest” discretions,
which they hold under the relevant legislation.6
The Article then highlights steps in the journey of a complaint from dissat-
isfaction to formal discipline. The aim here is to identify particular points in the
escalation of a complaint where a restorative approach could be particularly
beneficial for complainants or lawyers complained about, more likely to
achieve restorative outcomes or the approach more easily put into action. The
Article will demonstrate the benefits of applying a restorative approach at the
very earliest opportunity, when the complaint is received by a lawyer or law
firm and before it escalates to a formal, external complaint.
The Article goes on to discuss the question of compensation in lawyer
discipline. Disciplinary systems in Australia have had the power since the
1980s to award compensation while simultaneously disciplining lawyers in the
same proceedings.7 A restorative approach might assume that compensatory
and disciplinary outcomes could be on the table at the same time as part of a
possible suite of outcomes from a restorative conference. However, the grant-
ing of compensatory powers to disciplinary tribunals has proven problematic
for Australian tribunals. The Article explores these problems and considers
their implications for restorative justice.
HISTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN AUSTRALIA
Much of the impetus for Brown and Wolf’s Article is ongoing dissatisfac-
tion with the way complaints against lawyers are handled in the United States.8
This too has been the experience in Australia.9
Australia is a federation of six states and two territories. The individual
state supreme courts govern the legal profession but with a right of appeal to
the High Court of Australia.10 The most vocal dissatisfaction with lawyer disci-
pline and the most concerted efforts to initiate reform in the past have occurred
5 Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 267–69 (2012).
6 See Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 448; John Briton, Legal Servs. Comm’r, Com-
plaints About Lawyers: Regulation, Representation and Restorative Justice, Address at the
Bar Association of Queensland 2008 Annual Conference 17–20 (Feb. 17, 2008) (Austl.),
http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/data/assets/pdf_file/0011/106220/complaints-about-lawyers.pdf.
7 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 171D; Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 133(1)(a).
8 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 258–61.
9 Leslie Levin, Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System: The Queensland Experience, 9
LEGAL ETHICS 187, 187 (2006) [hereinafter Levin, Queensland Experience].
10 See Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 35(2); Clyne v N.S.W. Bar Ass’n (1960) 104 CLR 186,
198 (Austl.).
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in the largest state—New South Wales.11 There, lawyer discipline has been
under scrutiny since the 1960s, largely because of perceptions that the self-
regulating profession had taken inadequate account of consumer concerns.12
Over time, a single gateway for complaints has developed in most Australian
jurisdictions. Complaints are now more commonly received by an independent
statutory regulator, not by professional bodies as in the past.13
When the profession was still self-regulating and receiving complaints
about its members, it applied the traditional definition of the sort of conduct
that made a lawyer liable to discipline—professional misconduct.14 This defini-
tion focuses more on the profession’s sensibilities than on the impact of a law-
yer’s conduct on consumers as it defines professional misconduct as conduct
“which would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by . . .
professional brethren of good repute and competency.”15 In the late 1980s in
New South Wales and early 1990s in Victoria, legislation sought to include
more consumer-focused definitions of the sorts of conduct liable to disci-
pline.16 A new lesser disciplinary offence was inserted—“unsatisfactory pro-
fessional conduct.”17 This was defined as conduct that fell short of the
standards of competence and diligence that a member of the public was entitled
to expect of a “reasonably competent legal practitioner.”18 Legislative reforms
have also encouraged disciplinary tribunals to consider a broad range of reha-
bilitative orders, including orders requiring education, supervision, inspections,
or practice limitations.19 Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australian disci-
plinary tribunals have had legislative power to award compensation of up to
$15,000 to complainants.20 They could also order lawyers to repay fees, to
work for free, or to work for a stated amount.21 Statutory regulators in Austra-
lia have had powers to mediate client complaints about lawyers since the early
1990s.22
In summary, the legal profession in Australia no longer self regulates. The
organised bar now plays a more limited role, often just performing tasks that
11 Christine Parker, Regulation of the Ethics of Australian Legal Practice: Autonomy and
Responsiveness, 25 U.N.S.W.L.J. 676, 690 (2002) (Austl.).
12 DAVID WEISBROT, AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS 210 (1990).
13 See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 505 (Austl.); Legal Profession Act 2004
(Vic) s 4.2.5 (Austl.); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 429 (Aust.).
14 GINO DAL PONT, LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 522 (2010).
15 Allinson v Gen. Council of Med. Educ. & Registration (1894) 1 QB 750, 763 (England)
(following the common law test applied to medical practitioners).
16 See Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 127(2) (Austl.); Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s
137 (Austl.).
17 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 127(2), inserted by Legal Profession Reform Act
1993 (NSW) sch 2; Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 137.
18 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 127(2), inserted by Legal Profession Reform Act
1993 (NSW) sch 2. This definition of unsatisfactory professional conduct has remained con-
stant since being duplicated in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 496 when that Act
replaced the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW). Parker, supra note 11, at 692; see also Legal
Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 137.
19 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 149; Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 159(1).
20 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 171D; Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 133(1)(a).
21 See, e.g., Legal Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 133(1).
22 See, e.g., Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 143(1).
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independent statutory regulators choose to delegate to it from time to time.23
Almost continuous rounds of legislative reform have shifted powers away from
the profession. Legislative reforms have also granted a broad range of dispute
resolution powers to these independent statutory regulators. In particular, reha-
bilitative and restorative orders have been made available to disciplinary tribu-
nals for over twenty years. This means that Australia is further down the path to
a restorative justice approach to discipline than appears to be the case in the
parts of the United States described by Brown and Wolf.
On the other hand, it could perhaps be said that professional discipline in
Australia suffers from an even greater identity crisis than systems in the United
States, because, at the same time that legislation encourages these more restora-
tive orders, monetary fines continue to be part of the disciplinary landscape.24
Fines are not used in the United States because of their punitive effect.25
Hence, the path to embrace restorative justice in lawyer discipline might be
clearer in the United States given this clearer renunciation of punitive intent in
discipline.
There are other distinctive features of legal practice in Australia that are
relevant to any discussion of a restorative approach in lawyer discipline. First,
all Australian lawyers are required to carry professional indemnity insurance.26
Fidelity Funds tend to cover client losses that are due to fraud and so are
excluded from insurance coverage.27 Hence, comparatively speaking, Austra-
lian clients are well indemnified against losses caused by their lawyers. Implicit
in some of the discussion by Brown and Wolf is an assumption that more
restorative justice within U.S. lawyer disciplinary systems would ensure more
clients are compensated for their losses.28 In Australia, it is arguable that insur-
ers and fidelity funds already pick up more of this slack. Second, interest
earned on client money in lawyers’ general trust accounts in Australia is not
paid to clients but is used to subsidise lawyer regulation as well as the fidelity
fund.29 This interest is not used by disciplinary agencies in the United States
because this would be seen as a taking of clients’ private property and so offend
the Fifth Amendment.30
23 Legal Profession, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Vic), http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/home/
the+justice+system/legal+profession/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (Austl.).
24 See Linda Haller, Disciplinary Fines: Deterrence or Retribution?, 5 LEGAL ETHICS 152,
152 (2002) [hereinafter Haller, Disciplinary Fines].
25 See JOINT COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, NAT’L CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & THE
ABA, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 112 (1979) (fines are seen as
tantamount to a criminal penalty).
26 Table 1: Professional Indemnity Insurance Requirements Around the World, http://
www.practicepro.ca/LawPROmag/ProfessionalIndemnity_AroundWorld.pdf (last visited
Jan. 24, 2012).
27 FIN. INDUS. COMPLAINTS SERV. LTD., COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
FOR AFS LICENSEES 6–7 (2007), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFile
Name/Consultation_paper_87_submission_FICS.pdf/$file/Consultation_paper_87_submis-
sion_FICS.pdf (Austl.).
28 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 268–69.
29 Reid Mortensen, Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 289, 306
(2005).
30 Id. at 312.
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No comprehensive comparison has been done of the workload, costs, and
resourcing of disciplinary systems in the United States and Australia. However,
the appropriation of this interest on money in trust accounts might mean there
is more money to pursue restorative justice options in Australia. Even then,
however, the fact that this money comes from clients, and not lawyers them-
selves, might raise ethical concerns: restorative justice initiatives promoted by
the profession can perhaps be more readily pursued if it is lawyers themselves
who are funding the initiatives. If instead it is to be funded by clients, then it
becomes essential to show a direct benefit to clients.
LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN AUSTRALIA TODAY—AN OVERVIEW
The Australian lawyer disciplinary system has some important differences
to the system that operates in the United States. Most importantly, and as noted
previously, it involves far less self-regulation by the profession than the system
described by Brown and Wolf.31 In Australia, most complaints about lawyers
are received by an independent statutory body.32 The organised bar (by which I
mean the professional body representing solicitors and the professional body
representing barristers) today still play a role, but usually only when the statu-
tory regulator chooses to delegate the investigation of a particular complaint or
other regulatory function.33 The reduced role played by the organised bar has a
number of consequences for our current discussion of restorative justice. Any
regulatory system must have legitimacy and moral authority. The restorative
justice model envisioned by Brown and Wolf arguably has greater moral
authority within a self-regulating system; lawyers may be more willing to par-
ticipate in a scheme for which their own profession is responsible, rather than a
scheme dreamt up by an external regulator or imposed by legislation.34 Second,
Brown and Wolf are concerned that any model of lawyer discipline too domi-
nated by non-lawyers may shift its attention from conduct to consequences.35
The experience of independent regulation in Australia should allay this particu-
lar concern.36 However, it is true that the profession and independent regulators
can have different priorities, and this may impact priorities in restorative justice
processes and objectives.
The Article will describe the various stages of formal complaint handling
in the Australian system and consider the opportunities for a restorative
approach to be applied. Before doing so however, it is valuable to consider the
opportunities for a restorative approach to be undertaken before a formal com-
plaint is lodged.
31 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 278–80.
32 See e.g., Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.2.5; Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s
505; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 429(1). These are the three largest states.
33 Legal Profession, supra note 23.
34 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 305–06.
35 See id. at 267.
36 See Levin, Queensland Experience, supra note 9, at 196–98, 207–08.
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Internal Complaint Handling within a Firm
If we adopt a broad, inclusive understanding of restorative justice, then it
is useful to consider the opportunities for such an approach to be applied when
complaints are received by law firms, before they escalate to complaints that
are taken to external, disciplinary bodies. Not a lot of work has been done as to
how law firms handle complaints internally, but the general consensus appears
to be that the legal profession is less sophisticated in its response to complaints
than many other service industries.37 There are a number of potential barriers to
implementing a restorative justice approach in formal disciplinary proceedings.
These include considerations of confidentiality, legislative constraints, and
external accountability. However, none of these impediments apply when a
complaint is received by the law firm. It may be useful to demonstrate this
using the prototypical hypothetical case proposed by Brown and Wolf:
A sole practitioner, John Wilson, has a diverse practice, including every-
thing from wills and trusts, to real estate matters, to plaintiffs’ personal injury
cases, but he is struggling to make ends meet. Tom Taylor retains Wilson to
represent him in a small commercial case against a supplier who delivered
defective goods to Taylor’s small business. Wilson files the initial complaint,
but then loses track of the case in the whirlwind of developing his practice and
maintaining the many other matters he is handling. Wilson fails to return sev-
eral calls from Taylor checking on the status of the case. Then the case is
dismissed due to Wilson’s failure to comply with the defendant’s discovery
request. Wilson never informs Taylor of the dismissal. From other sources,
Taylor eventually learns of the status of his case. Since the statute of limitations
has not run, Taylor retains a new lawyer to file a timely and successful motion
to reopen the case. Still, Taylor is extremely upset with Wilson, and feels that
Wilson should not be permitted to go on as he has in ways that could harm
other clients.38
Brown and Wolf’s Tom Taylor goes immediately to the state’s Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission to file a complaint against his law-
yer, Wilson.39 There might be many advantages for both Taylor and Wilson if
Taylor first raised his concerns with the firm itself. But, in this scenario, Wilson
is a sole practitioner.40 In Australia, sole practitioners are heavily over-repre-
sented in disciplinary proceedings, just as they are in the United States.41 There
are a multitude of reasons for this that are explored elsewhere.42 Suffice to say,
Wilson’s status as a sole practitioner may increase the likelihood of client com-
plaints but also reduce the practical opportunities for a restorative justice
37 Christine Parker & Linda Haller, Inside Running: Internal Complaints Management
Practice and Regulation in the Legal Profession, 37 MONASH U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming
2012).
38 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 261.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Linda Haller, Solicitors’ Disciplinary Hearings in Queensland 1930-2000: A Statistical
Analysis, 13 BOND L. REV. 1, 16 (2001).
42 Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 309, 310–18 (2004).
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approach to Taylor’s complaint at an early stage. In particular, what neutral
party can act as facilitator?
It may be more useful to consider the situation if Wilson was a lawyer
within a larger legal practice. This provides an opportunity to envision a setting
in which a restorative justice approach could be adopted at a very early stage. It
also recognises that restorative justice models should reflect the frequency of
human interactions in organisational settings.43 There may be good reason for
Taylor to make the law firm aware of his dissatisfaction with one of its lawyers
before he takes his complaint to an external regulator. In Australia, all lawyers
must hold professional indemnity insurance.44 This facilitates the opportunity
for clients to receive some redress for neglect in a less formal and more sum-
mary and timely way than in parts of the United States without compulsory
insurance.
Over and above any question of compensation, Taylor may be pleased to
attend a meeting between himself, Wilson, and other members of Wilson’s
immediate community—the law firm. There, Taylor can fully tell the story of
his frustration, can hear from Wilson and other members of the law firm how
such neglect of Taylor’s case was allowed to occur, and what systems the law
firm has or intends to put in place to ensure that the firm as a whole—as well as
Wilson—takes greater care of future clients.
Restorative justice in this forum has many advantages over attempting a
restorative justice approach at later, more formal and external stages. The duty
of confidentiality is owed to the client, Taylor, by the law firm as a whole, so
any roundtable discussion can take place in a highly protected and safe environ-
ment. This protects the reputation of the lawyer and law firm, and the privacy
of the client, Taylor. Second, even if an external complaint is subsequently
lodged, the fact that the firm has attempted to take “appropriate remedial
action” may cause the regulator to decide that no further formal action is
required.45 Third, this discussion is not inhibited in any way by the many legis-
lative requirements that may constrain the form that restorative justice can take
once Taylor takes his complaint to an external regulator. Related to this, once
Taylor’s complaint is in the hands of an external regulator, that regulator is
subject to demands for accountability in the handling of the complaint that do
not constrain the law firm. These constraints on the regulator are considered
later in the Article.
We turn now to consider complaints that are not resolved internally by the
law firm and escalate to a formal complaint lodged with a regulator.
43 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 243.
44 See Table 1: Professional Indemnity Insurance Requirements Around the World, supra
note 26.
45 See Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 117(4)(b) (Austl.).
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STAGES IN FORMAL COMPLAINTS AND DISCIPLINE
Receipt of Complaint
All complaints about lawyers in most parts of Australia are received by an
independent statutory body.46 That body decides whether the complaint appears
to be about a civil dispute or about a lawyer’s conduct.47 If about a lawyer’s
conduct, the statutory regulator then decides whether to investigate the com-
plaint itself or to delegate this task to one of the professional bodies (the
organised bar).48 After investigation, the regulator needs to decide what to do
with the complaint.49 As is the experience in the United States and many other
jurisdictions, only a very small proportion of matters proceed to a formal disci-
plinary hearing; a much greater proportion are summarily dismissed or dealt
with informally.50 To understand why this is the case, it is informative to look
at the sorts of matters that Australian clients complain about. Here, the Austra-
lian experience tracks the experience in the United States. As many as thirty
percent of complaints are about costs and lawyer’s fees.51 Another eighteen
percent allege neglect, and five percent allege poor communication.52
These complaints are not the traditional sorts of matters with which lawyer
disciplinary systems concerned themselves.53 Complainants who raise issues of
overcharging and negligence are usually told to pursue their remedy against
lawyers in the general courts.54 Instead, disciplinary systems in Australia have
tended to focus on matters of dishonesty and on the regulatory failures of law-
yers, for instance a failure to respond to a regulator’s request for more
information.
Empirical studies into restorative justice have suggested a curvilinear rela-
tionship between participation rates for victims and the seriousness of offenses:
victims are less likely to participate if, in their eyes, the matter is too trivial to
be bothered with or too traumatic.55 Translated into the context of professional
discipline, this might mean that participation rates are unlikely to increase sim-
ply because regulators or outsiders might think they should; the current discon-
nect between the matters about which clients complain and the matters about
which regulators actually discipline would need to be addressed. For instance,
clients are unlikely to attend a conference that relates to a lawyer’s failure to
file trust account audit documents on time. If disciplinary systems are to adopt
46 See supra note 32.
47 See infra p. 110 (“Civil and Disciplinary Pathways of Complaints”).
48 See, e.g., Complaints, LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N (Qld), http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/com-
plaints#The%20Commission%27s%20role%20in%20relation%20to%20complaints (last vis-
ited Jan. 24, 2012).
49 See, e.g., id.
50 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 262.
51 LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (Vic), 2010 ANN. REP. 79 fig.34, available at http://lsc.vic.gov.
au/cms.php?user=legalservicesvic;doc=Home;page=;pageID=188.
52 Id.
53 Linda Haller, Professional Discipline for Incompetent Lawyers? Developments in the UK
and Australia, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 83, 84 (2010).
54 Id.
55 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 174.
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a more restorative approach, as advocated by Brown and Wolf,56 with the aim
of improving the complainant’s experience of the complaints process, the
implementers should address this point. Careful thought needs to be given as to
whether a restorative approach will be applied to the traditional type of discipli-
nary case, or whether in fact, disciplinary bodies will shift their attention to the
types of cases that clients care most about, and, hence, those with which they
are most likely to want to participate.57
Role of the Complainant
Civil and Disciplinary Pathways of Complaints
Brown and Wolf have noted the limited role played by complainants in the
U.S. grievance procedure.58 In Australia, the degree of involvement by the
complainant depends largely on how the complaint is categorised once received
by the regulator.59 It can be categorised as either a disciplinary complaint or a
civil complaint about a civil dispute.60 A complaint is categorised as a discipli-
nary complaint if the conduct would amount to unsatisfactory professional con-
duct or professional misconduct.61 A civil complaint about a civil dispute
means a dispute or claim about costs, that the complainant has suffered loss or
other genuine dispute between lawyer and client.62 This is far from a satisfac-
tory distinction. There is very little case law to assist. In essence, civil disputes
arise from a difference of opinion between lawyer and client about, for
instance, what would have been a reasonable fee. They do not involve any
broader ramifications for future clients. Where the complaint raises broader
questions about a lawyer’s fitness to practice and the need to protect future
clients, then it is more likely to be categorised as a disciplinary complaint.63
The complainant plays a very different role depending on how their com-
plaint is categorised, as explained below.
Disciplinary Complaint
If a complaint is categorised as a disciplinary complaint, as in the United
States, the complainant plays little or no role in the future handling of the disci-
pline application. Complainants will remain aware of how the discipline appli-
cation is proceeding if they are on “stand-by” to give evidence in a contested
hearing.64 However, only a very small percentage of disciplinary investigations
proceed to a contested hearing in which the complainant is required to give
evidence in person.65 It is much more common for disciplinary complaints to
56 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 314.
57 Brown and Wolf seem to believe a supplementary use of restorative justice processes is
most likely. Id. at 284.
58 Id. at 262.
59 See Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.2.11.
60 See Id. s 4.2.2-4.2.3
61 Id. s 4.2.3(1).
62 Id. s 4.2.2.
63 See, e.g., Id. s 4.2.3 (Victoria’s definition of “disciplinary complaint”).
64 Scott McLean, Evidence in Legal Profession Disciplinary Hearings: Changing the Law-
yers Paradigm, 28 U.Q. L. J. 225, 240 (2010).
65 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 262.
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be summarily dismissed, for the statutory regulator to exercise powers to deal
with the complaint summarily, for the lawyer to admit the facts of the com-
plaint and argue instead about whether these facts amount to misconduct, or for
the lawyer to admit misconduct and argue instead how the disciplinary tribunal
should dispose of the adverse findings.66 All of these processes can take place
without any input from, or notification to, the complainant.
Civil Dispute
Complainants can and must take a much more active role if the regulator
classifies their complaint as one about a civil dispute rather than one about the
conduct of their lawyer. The statutory regulator is required to attempt to resolve
civil disputes,67 but will not investigate the matters alleged in such com-
plaints.68 If attempts by the regulator to resolve the dispute break down, the
regulator will not take any further action or assist the complainant in any other
way; the onus is on the complainant to issue civil proceedings against the law-
yer in the general courts.69
INVESTIGATION OF DISCIPLINARY COMPLAINTS
The regulator will choose to investigate some complaints. If the complaint
appears to raise issues of misconduct by the lawyer, the regulator must investi-
gate.70 This is done by the independent regulator or delegated to one of the
professional bodies—the Law Society if the complaint is about a solicitor, or
the Bar if the complaint is about a barrister. The complainant has no say as to
what will happen after her complaint is investigated, although she is told what
the regulator has decided to do in relation to the complaint following investiga-
tion, and why.71
Formal Disciplinary Hearings
The role played by the complainant in any formal disciplinary hearing will
depend largely on the regulator. Disciplinary proceedings in Australia are open
so any member of the public can attend.72 The complainant has no privileged
status in that regard. This was well demonstrated in the recent Victorian disci-
plinary case of Legal Services Commissioner v Elliott.73 The client, Parkin, had
complained to the Legal Services Commissioner that his lawyer, Elliott, was
guilty of delay in relation to proposed litigation.74 Elliot failed to respond to the
commissioner’s requests for a response to Parkin’s complaints, so disciplinary
66 See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (Vic), supra note 51, at Figure 39.
67 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.3.5(1).
68 See id. s 4.3.7.
69 See id. s 4.3.5(5); id. s 4.3.15. The dispute may then be heard in the statutory tribunal
established to hear simple civil disputes or in the general courts if the matter is more com-
plex or involves more than $25,000 in disputed costs. See id. s 4.3.15; id. s 4.3.17(1)(a).
70 Id. s 4.4.7(1).
71 Id. s 4.4.14(1)(a).
72 Linda Haller, Dirty Linen: The Public Shaming of Lawyers, 10 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 281,
282 (2003).
73 See Legal Servs. Comm’r v Elliott [2007] VCAT 2244.
74 See id. ¶ 2.
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charges in relation to these failures to respond were brought.75 The client was
clearly interested in what transpired at the disciplinary hearing and travelled
from South Australia to attend the hearing.76 However, there, he was told by
the tribunal that he “was fully entitled to be present, although his attendance
was not a necessary part of the hearing of these charges.”77 Parkin played no
part in the hearing as the lawyer’s refusal to respond had transformed the
inquiry from whether Parkin’s complaint was substantiated into whether the
respondent lawyer had failed to respond to the commissioner’s request for an
explanation.78 Parkin could only observe from the public gallery of the discipli-
nary tribunal, with no greater role to play than any other member of the public
who chose to view the hearing on that day. The one concession made to Parkin
was that the lawyer agreed to reimburse his costs of travelling to the hearing,
and the tribunal took this into account when calculating the fine the lawyer was
ordered to pay.79 A more restorative model would acknowledge Parkin’s frus-
trations that his lawyer continued to ignore his complaints and would allow
Parkin to voice these frustrations to the lawyer or tribunal.
The impotence of complainants continues beyond the hearing of the
charges. Professional bodies have a power to appeal in those states of Australia
where they still hold the power to prosecute a discipline application, but other-
wise only the regulator or lawyer have a right of appeal.80 The complainant has
no power to appeal any disciplinary decision with which they are dissatisfied.81
Restorative Justice through Statutory Regulators
Statutory regulators in Australia have a statutory obligation to attempt to
resolve civil disputes that are the subject of a civil complaint.82 They can
attempt to resolve those disputes in a variety of ways. The most formal is
through mediation.
Mediation
Regulators have had the power since the early 1990s to facilitate the medi-
ation of complaints that they have categorised as civil disputes.83 Legislative
protections have sought to enhance the attractiveness of mediations to both
lawyers and clients. For instance, mediators are subject to the strictest confi-
dentiality obligations, much stricter than apply to the Legal Services Commis-
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. ¶ 8(iv).
78 Id. ¶ 2.
79 Id. at ¶¶ 8(iv), 9. In Australia, unlike in the United States, fines are a common form of
order in lawyer discipline. Haller, Disciplinary Fines, supra note 24, at 152.
80 Linda Haller, Imperfect Practice under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), 23 U.
QUEENSL. L.J. 411, 428–29 (2004).
81 See, e.g., PROF’L STANDARDS DEP’T, LAW SOC’Y OF N.S.W., COMPLAINTS PROCESS
INFORMATION 4 (2009), available at http://www.lawsociety.com.au/idc/groups/public/docu-
ments/internetcostguidebook/026150.pdf (In NSW, complainants are only permitted to
appeal a compensation order).
82 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.3.5(1).
83 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 144, inserted by Legal Profession Reform Act 1993
(NSW) sch 2.
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sioner (the chief regulator) or any other person within the Commissioner’s
office. For instance, a mediator is prohibited from assisting police with investi-
gations or from giving evidence in criminal proceedings.84
Regulators can attempt to resolve civil disputes in ways apart from media-
tion. Some of these are recognised and facilitated by the legislative frame-
work.85 For instance, settlement agreements, whether reached through
mediation86 or otherwise,87 can be easily registered and enforced through the
courts. “[A]nything said or done in the course of attempting to resolve” any
civil dispute is inadmissible in any tribunal or court proceedings relating to the
same matter.88
Mediations have the potential to develop into the more idealised restora-
tive justice model advocated by Brown and Wolf.89 In some cases, mediations
are conducted over the telephone,90 but in face-to-face meetings, the mediator
has the power to allow additional stakeholders to attend the mediation.91 In
some parts of Australia, mediations are handled by the professional bodies
rather than by the independent statutory regulator.92 This means that the law-
yer’s community of peers plays a role. However, as a mediator in an indepen-
dent, rather than self-regulated, system, appointed by a professional body
pursuant to delegated statutory powers, professional colleagues here play a
much more circumscribed role than the full, but equal, community-participant
role envisioned by Brown and Wolf.93
As explained earlier, complaints about Australian lawyers are bifurcated at
a very early stage of their receipt by the regulatory body. There is no formal
power to mediate complaints that have been categorised, not as civil disputes
but, as raising questions of conduct that may lead to findings of professional
misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct. Here, the analogy to the
position in the United States is much closer. Regulators are required by the
legislation to take much greater control over how a complaint about conduct
will proceed and complainants usually play a negligible role. For instance, if
the regulator forms the view that an investigation of the conduct shows that a
disciplinary tribunal would find (the more serious) professional misconduct, in
some jurisdictions the regulator must refer the matter to a formal disciplinary
hearing.94 There is no discretion to take a restorative approach as an alternative.
So, generally speaking, in serious conduct investigations, complainants take
only as much part in subsequent proceedings as decided by the regulator. That
84 Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 6.4.5(3).
85 Id. s 4.3.5(2)(b).
86 Id. s 4.3.12.
87 Id. s 4.3.5A.
88 Id. s 4.3.5(4).
89 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 255.
90 Complaints About Lawyers, OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (NSW), http://www.lawl-
ink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/pages/OLSC_complaints (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
91 Fact Sheet on Mediation, LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (Vic), http://www.lsc.vic.gov.au/docu-
ments/LSC_Fact_Sheet_Mediations.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
92 PROF’L STANDARDS DEP’T, LAW SOC’Y OF N.S.W., supra note 81, at 2.
93 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 255.
94 E.g., Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.4.13(2).
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role will also always be a very passive one, for instance, the giving of evidence
in any formal disciplinary hearing that follows.
More discretion is given as to whether or not to bring formal disciplinary
proceedings if the regulator believes a tribunal would only find the (less seri-
ous) unsatisfactory professional conduct. Here, there might seem more opportu-
nity for restorative justice principles to come into play. However, while much
thought has been given in the legislation to encourage settlement of civil dis-
putes, this is not true in relation to conduct matters. Here, the legislation is
predicated on an assumption that discipline will follow a certain path. The leg-
islation gives the regulator none of the clear procedural protections it provides
had the regulator categorised the complaint as a civil dispute.95 Lawyers are not
given the same procedural protections put in place for formal discipline. For
instance, mediators can only engage with civil disputes, not conduct matters;
only mediators can promise the highest duties of confidentiality to participating
parties; only evidence of things said or done to resolve civil disputes and docu-
ments prepared for mediation are declared inadmissible in other proceedings;
and only resolutions of civil disputes, not disciplinary complaints, can be regis-
tered for enforcement in the general courts.
This would appear to give the regulator fewer structural supports to adopt
restorative processes in relation to a lawyer’s conduct than if the regulator had
categorised the complaint as a civil dispute between lawyer and client. Despite
this, some regulators have taken a more expansive, creative view of their pow-
ers to deal with conduct matters without proceeding to a formal disciplinary
hearing.
For instance, the Legal Services Commissioner in Queensland has discre-
tion to dismiss a complaint or investigation if it is in the public interest to do
so.96 In 2007, the commissioner released a policy indicating the many factors
he will take into account in deciding whether it is in the public interest to
dismiss or proceed with a complaint.97 This policy displays many of the
hallmarks of restorative justice. Indeed, the commissioner himself has
described it so.98 Powerful factors that might cause the commissioner to dis-
miss a complaint in the public interest include evidence that the lawyer or law
firm acknowledges error, has shown remorse, has apologised or made good any
loss or harm the conduct has caused to others, has cooperated fully and frankly
during the investigation, and whether the conduct is likely to be repeated.99
Notably, the commissioner has applied this policy for the past four years with-
out the added protections given had the matter progressed as a civil dispute.
Other Australian regulators have taken similar proactive, creative
approaches to their statutory powers. Brown and Wolf have noted that the
“mediation” label sometimes falls into disfavour.100 The Victorian regulator
95 See supra p. 111 (“Civil Dispute”).
96 Legal Profession Act 2007 (Queensl.) s 448(1)(b).
97 Briton, supra note 6.
98 Id.
99 Prosecution Guidelines: Unsatisfactory Professional Conduct and Professional Miscon-
duct, LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N (Qld) 8, http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/
0018/106335/prosecution-guidelines.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
100 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 290.
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rarely utilises mediation101 despite the legislative supports provided for it. It is
beyond the purposes of this Article to explore the reasons for this. However,
further research would be extremely valuable, especially if it is proposed to
introduce more structured, legislative supports to facilitate a restorative
approach. Such research may find that, instead, local regulators prefer broad
discretion to fashion a form of restorative justice best suited to local and chang-
ing conditions and even personal preferences of the regulator. This is consistent
with Brown and Wolf’s observation that the form of diversionary programs
used in various parts of the United States depends substantially on the orienta-
tion and philosophy of the chief disciplinary counsel in that jurisdiction.102
Whatever the reasons for the declining use of mediation in Victoria, this
may be viewed with relief by those proponents of restorative justice who see
mediation as having the potential to undermine some of its values.103 Instead of
mediation, the Victorian regulator appears to have fashioned forms of dispute
resolution out of broad discretions contained in the Act, in a similar way to the
commissioner in Queensland. For instance, in April 2010, the Victorian regula-
tor introduced a “Rapid Resolution Team” charged with resolving complaints
through informal dispute resolution processes, including by suggesting to
respondent lawyers that they apologise to the complainant.104
However, at present, Australian legislation does not explicitly deal with
initiatives such as the Rapid Resolution Team: while issues of confidentiality
and enforcement have been anticipated and dealt with in relation to steps to
resolve civil disputes, the legislation remains silent in relation to conduct dis-
putes. Australian regulators have fashioned de facto powers to deal with com-
plaints, but this is always at some risk of legal challenge. Hence, they have
asked for greater and clearer power to deal with complaints in flexible and
summary ways as they see fit rather than proceed to a formal hearing.105 They
appear to have been successful in that.106
COMPENSATION
The Relevance of Compensation
Given that the primary aim of discipline is to protect the public, and the
public is protected by the payment of compensation, it may seem logical that a
101 LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (Vic), supra note 51, at 10. The manager of complaints resolu-
tion and investigations has said this is because formal mediation is usually only appropriate
in complex matters where a lot of money is at stake. See Jennifer Pakula, ADR in Complaints
Handling, LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (Vic) 6, http://www.lsc.vic.gov.au/cms.php?user=legal
servicesvic;doc=Home;page=;pageID=188 (under “Speeches and Conference Papers” select
“Alternative dispute resolution in complaint handling”) (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
102 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 266.
103 See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 249; Roche, supra note 2, at 226.
104 LEGAL SERVS. COMM’R (Vic), supra note 51, at 11.
105 John Briton, Legal Servs. Comm’r (Qld), National Legal Profession Reform and the
Regulation of the Future, St Vincents’ 48th Annual Queensland Law Society Symposium, 17
(Mar. 27, 2010) (Austl.), http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/106080/
national-legal-profession-reform-and-the-regulation-of-the-future.pdf.
106 Francesca Bartlett, The Role of Apologies in Lawyers’ Professional Discipline, 14
LEGAL ETHICS 49, 69 (2011).
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disciplinary tribunal facilitate compensation. The risk of such an approach is
that it draws “the public” too narrowly and prefers the interests of past clients
over the potential risk that may remain for future clients. However, courts and
tribunals have regularly taken compensation into account when determining the
appropriate disciplinary order. For instance, in Re Roche,107 the Supreme Court
of the Australian Capital Territory acknowledged that the practitioners’ offer of
a $150,000 compensation fund was a “significant mitigatory factor” as it indi-
cated recognition of their “disgraceful” misconduct in grossly overcharging cli-
ents.108 The Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory immediately
applauded the court’s decision in a press release and claimed that, had the offer
of compensation not been made, it was “highly likely” that the two solicitors
would have been struck off rather than suspended for eighteen months.109 The
society also claimed that the decision was a “break through” for consumers of
legal services as clients would have not been reimbursed if the solicitors had
been struck off.110 Such comments highlight a tension within the disciplinary
system between a desire to protect past clients and potential clients. The same
tension was apparent in the Queensland tribunal decision of Re Practitioner
X,111 where the practitioner was fined $25,000 rather than suspended so as to
ensure that past clients were repaid amounts which had been overcharged.
It could be argued that the ACT Supreme Court gave too much weight to
the compensation fund in Re Roche, especially as the court had otherwise
found that the client agreements were “extortionate” and that the two solicitors
“cheated and, effectively, defrauded their clients,”112 not in an isolated inci-
dent, but in a habitual practice,113 which was “an exercise in calculated greed
[which] depriv[ed] vulnerable injured persons of many thousands of dol-
lars.”114 It could be argued that the protection of future clients was compro-
mised by an effort to achieve a compensatory outcome. Compensation for
overcharging could have been more appropriately addressed by the clients in
separate civil proceedings.
Compensation Orders
Over twenty years ago, powers in relation to compensation of complain-
ants were grafted onto pre-existing powers of disciplinary tribunals.115 This has
proven to be problematic. Tribunals have been unsure as to how this power
interacts with the complainant’s rights to take civil action against the subject
lawyer. The test of what is being compensated and why has also been problem-
atic. Prosecution bodies have felt uncomfortable playing the dual role of seek-
107 Re Law Soc’y of the Austl. Cap. Terr. & Roche (2002) 171 FLR 138, 149.
108 Id. at 152.
109 Press Release, Law Soc’y of the Austl. Cap. Terr., Landmark Decision Protects Law-
yers’ Clients (Oct. 21, 2002).
110 Id.
111 In re Practitioner X (1999) 5 Disciplinary Action Report 23, 25–26. The overcharging
amounted to $46,420. Haller, Disciplinary Fines, supra note 24, at 175 n.167.
112 Roche 171 FLR at 149.
113 Id. at 150.
114 Id. at 153.
115 See Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 149(3)(d).
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ing discipline and arguing for compensation. Complainants who seek
compensation have had a voice in proceedings, but have been left unsure as to
their rights of standing and the degree to which the prosecuting body will act on
their behalf.116 Examples such as these require serious thought by those who
advocate restorative justice in lawyer discipline.
In the next section, we consider a particular challenge that restorative jus-
tice may face in the context of lawyer discipline.
LAWYERS AS THE SUBJECT GROUP
Lawyers and judges have been among the most vocal cynics of restorative
justice. Braithwaite has been moved to suggest that lawyers (when representing
clients or acting as facilitators) may need to be removed from restorative
processes to give those processes the highest chance of success.117 This does
not auger well if it is to be lawyers themselves who take part in a restorative
conference, not as representative of a client or expert mediator, but as a princi-
pal participant whose own conduct lies under a cloud. The heartland of success
for restorative justice has been in relation to juvenile offenders. The juvenile
offender is worlds apart from a practising lawyer. Will lawyers be able and
willing to shed their professional mystique to take part in the restorative pro-
cess as an equal?
There are implications for complainants, too. In the most successful set-
ting for restorative justice—juvenile offending—the victim is likely to be more
mature, experienced, confident, and articulate than the juvenile perpetrator.
Sophisticated clients tend not to take their complaints to a statutory regulator;
they usually have more effective ways to demonstrate their dissatisfaction and
to extract apologies and other more material forms of restorative justice from
their lawyers than to take their complaint to a statutory regulator.118 By taking
their complaint there, they run the risk of their legal issue and cause for com-
plaint eventually being aired in a public disciplinary hearing. This leaves those
clients who do complain about their lawyer to the statutory regulator. These are
more vulnerable clients. In this interaction, it is likely that the lawyer will be
more confident and articulate than the client. Clients are likely to be the dis-
empowered party in a restorative process that by its nature builds on skills of
dialogue and narrative that are so familiar to lawyers.119
Restorative justice may also have been particularly successful in relation
to juvenile offenders because victims and other members of the community
believe in their great redemptive potential. Those who complain about lawyers,
a privileged group within society who are often labeled arrogant and egotistical,
may feel less inclined to cooperate in a process where they have less confi-
dence in lawyers’ redemptive capacity. Victims of crime may be encouraged to
participate by reports of reduced anger and fear of victimisation experienced by
116 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Comm’r v Elliott [2007] VCAT 2244.
117 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 249.
118 Parker & Haller, supra note 37, at 40–41.
119 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 172.
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previous victims who participated in restorative justice conferences.120 “Vic-
tims” of lawyers may feel they have less need to resolve these issues and can
best avoid future harm by not engaging lawyers to act for them again in the
future.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has sought to highlight some distinctive features
of Australian lawyer discipline and the ways in which lawyer complaints and
disciplinary systems in Australia already use restorative processes. It has also
highlighted the need for us to keep clearly in view why we might want to shift
to a more restorative model. The assumption in Brown and Wolf’s Article
appears to be that the primary advantage would be to improve the experience of
the disciplinary system for complainants. But, as Brown and Wolf themselves
acknowledge, this could be at the expense of other stakeholders such as future
clients and ethical standards more broadly.121
The evidence also remains unclear as to whether restorative justice in
other contexts reduces rates of recidivism. A restorative approach may prove
cathartic for some lawyers, but many lawyers are subject to complaints and
discipline because of mental ill-health. I would argue a roundtable conference
is not appropriate in those cases,122 although elements of a restorative approach
can be used, and are already in use, by Australian regulators.
One of the greatest challenges for restorative justice in any setting is to
balance it against the need for transparency and accountability. This is some-
thing of which Brown and Wolf are clearly aware.123 The recent experience in
Australia has been that formal discipline can be unsatisfactory for a broad range
of reasons: it is slow, unresponsive, and expensive.124 But, in its favour, it is
highly public and transparent. The general community and other stakeholders
need to decide what degree of discretion they are willing to give regulators to
deal with complaints about lawyers behind closed doors—to condone greater
use of a regulatory pyramid.125 Is more transparency and accountability
required in relation to lawyers than in relation to other regulated entities, given
lawyers’ commitment to traditional, procedural justice? Are lawyers a special
case? This Article has argued that they may be. John Braithwaite might tend to
agree. It is interesting to note that as champion of both regulatory pyramids and
restorative justice, he has also been highly skeptical of the ability of lawyers to
embrace the values of restorative justice.126 Hence, it will be interesting to see
his views in this current debate spawned by Brown and Wolf’s Article.
120 Michael S. King, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rise of Emo-
tionally Intelligent Justice, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 1096, 1106 (2008) (Austl.).
121 Brown & Wolf, supra note 5, at 281.
122 While Brown and Wolf acknowledge the high rates of mental ill-health among lawyers
who face discipline, they do not discuss this question explicitly. Id. at 259.
123 Id. at 300–01.
124 Parker, supra note 11, at 700; Levin, Queensland Experience, supra note 9, at 195.
125 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DER-
EGULATION DEBATE 44 (1992).
126 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 3, at 249.
